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I. INTRODUCTION
There has been an increasing interest on the effects of the United
Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea (Hamburg Rules) on
the double insurance problem which arises whenever a proposal to modify
a carrier's liability regime is under discussion.' The Hamburg Rules can
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1. The Hague Rules were so controversial in the United States that it took Congress 12
years to enact them. The Visby Amendments have given us a quarter century of controversy,
with no end in sight. The Hamburg Rules have been controversial practically since the United
Nations first began to work on them. The most prominent of the arguments that have reappeared
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potentially alter not only the price of insurance relevant to international
trade but also the insurance-purchasing behavior among parties involved in
international trade. Sets of propositions have been introduced explicating
whether and how the Hamburg Rules would affect insurance practices
among cargo owners, that is, mostly international traders and cargo
carriers.
Supporters of the Hamburg Rules have argued that adopting them
will decrease double insurance and overall insurance costs.2 Opponents
assert that these costs are lower under the Hague or the Hague-Visby Rules
than under the Hamburg Rules.3 However, neither side rests on empirical
virtually every time might be about "the insurance argument." Michael F. Sturley, Changing
Liability Rules and Marine Insurance: Conflicting Empirical Arguments about Hague, Visby,
and Hamburg in a Vacuum of Empirical Evidence, 24 J. MAR. L. & COM. 1, 120 (1993).
2. Examples of supporting arguments for the Hamburg Rules are as follows. First, for an
argument that the adoption of the rules would decrease total costs due to a higher standard of
care on the part of the carrier, see, for example, United Nations Conference on the Carriage of
Goods by Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.89/14 (1981) [hereinafter UN COGSA] (comments of the
Australian representative); Erling Selvig, The Hamburg Rules, the Hague Rules and Marine
Insurance Practice, 12 J. MAR. L. & COM., 299, 311 (1981). Second, for an example of
arguments that the clarity and better predictability of the Hamburg Rules will reduce litigation
and the expense of claims settlements, see Rolf Herber, The UN Convention on the Carriage of
Goods by Sea, 1978: Hamburg Rules, Its Future and the Demands of Developing Countries,
Y.B. MAR. L., 81, 91-92 (1984); But see John 0. Honnold, The United Nation Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL): The 1976 Draft Convention on the Carriage of Goods by
Sea, 4 ANN. PROC. FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 365, 370 (1978). Third, for an example of
arguments that shifting a greater proportion of the risk to the carrier and then to the P&I clubs in
the Hamburg Rules would reduce overall costs since P&I insurance is operated more cost-
effectively than cargo insurance see, Stephen Zamora, Carrier Liability For Damage or Loss to
Cargo in International Transport, 23 AM. J. COMP. L. 391, 394 n.12 (1975); Selvig, supra note
2 at 316; UNCTAD, Economic and Commercial Implications of the Entry into Force of the
Hamburg Rules and the Multimodal Transport Convention, U.N. Doc. TDIBIC.41315 (Part I),
16 (1987). See Sturley, supra note 1, at 121, n.14.
3. Examples of opponents' arguments against the Hamburg Rules are as follows. First,
for an argument that there is no reason to believe that cargo damage would be any less common
under the Hamburg regime, see John A. Maher & Joan D. Maher, Marine Transport, Cargo
Risks, and the Hamburg Rules: Rationalization or Imagery?, 84 DICK. L. REV. 183, 202 (1980).
Second, for an argument that the adoption of the Hamburg Rules would lead to unnecessary and
expensive litigation due to more confusing and less clear provisions, see George F. Chandler, A
Comparison of COGSA, the Hague/Visby Rules, and the Hamburg Rules, 15 J. MAR. L. & COM.
233, 237 (1984); Birch F. Reynardson, The Implications on Liability Insurance of the Hamburg
Rules, in THE HAMBURG RULES 1-2 (Lloyd's of London Seminar Sept. 28, 1978); J.P. Honour,
The P. & I. Clubs and the New United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea
1978, in THE HAMBURG RULES ON THE CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY SEA, 239-40 (Samir
Mankabady ed. 1978). Some Hamburg Rules opponents even seek to generalize these assertions
to contend that any change in well-established laws will lead to uncertainty and higher expenses.
See Herber, supra note 2, at 81, 91-92. Third, for an argument that the Hamburg Rules would
increase overall costs by exacerbating a needless double insurance expense, especially due to
higher costs in liability insurance than marine insurance, see, e.g., Thomas Chenal, Uniform
Rules for a Combined Transport Document in Light of the Proposed Revision of the Hague Rules,
20 ARIZ. L. REV. 975 n.144 (1978); UN COGSA, supra note 2, at 235 (comments of the
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evidence to support its arguments.4  Hence we cannot draw any
conclusions about their ostensible superiority or inferiority unless we
analyze the problem systematically with reliable information. First, the
Hamburg Rules have not yet been generally adopted as a common rule,
and the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules are applied in different ways in
different countries. Second, cargo insurance premiums are not based on
risk statistics because reliable statistics often are not available. Instead, the
premium is set according to the account (whether it is a large or small
policy, whether the insured is a new client, etc.) and according to the
underwriter's own intuition.5 Even if insurance costs increase, competitive
carriers will be able to absorb the increased costs internally rather than
shifting them to the shipper. This is because insurance cost is not a major
factor in rating total freight, which can be absorbed through more
reasonable management than before.6 With this reality in mind, it is hard
Japanese representative). Fourth, there is also concern that carriers may use the Hamburg Rules
as an excuse to increase rates even if their P&I calls do not increase. For such a concern, see,
e.g., Zamora, supra note 2, at 394, 395; Robert Hellawell, Less-Developed Countries and
Developed Country Law: Problems for the Law of Admiralty, 7 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 203,
212, 216 (1968). See Sturley, supra note 1, at 147.
4. There are authors who have stated that there is little reliable information for empirical
study on this problem. See, e.g., Sturley, supra note 1, at 148; UNCTAD, The Economic and
Commercial Implications of the Entry into Force of the Hamburg Rules and the Multimodal
Transport Convention, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.4/315 (Part I) 4, 16 (1987); Selvig, supra note 2, at
314; William Tetley, The Hamburg Rules: A Commentary, LLOYD'S MAR. J. COM. L.Q. 4
(1979); Janet M. Donovan, The Hamburg Rules: Why a New Convention on Carriage of Goods
by Sea, 4 MAR. L. 1, 9 (1979); Honour, supra note 3, at 244; John D. Kimball, Shipowner's
Liability and the Proposed Revision of the Hague Rules, 7 J. MAR. L. & COM. 250 (1975).
5. There are four main types of individual rate plans used in business insurance contracts:
1) the experience rating plan;
2) the retrospective rating plan;
3) the schedule rating plan; and
4) the judgment rating plan.
Of these, usually it is the judgment-rating plan that is adopted in marine cargo insurance, which
involves rating mainly according to the judgment of underwriter and not so much according to
any statistical rationales. The judgment rating plan is justifiably the most unscientific of the four
main plans commonly used.
6. Basically, the cost of liability insurance does not seem to consume any substantial
portion of total freight. According to a report by the United States Department of
Transportation, United States shipping companies' net cost of liability insurance amounts to about
0.15% of total freight receipts, and total cost of liability insurance (including claim amounts and
premium) amounts to about 2.05% of total freight receipts. Another report relates that the total
operating cost of liners is estimated from 8% to 25%, or 3-5% of average liner freight.
Therefore, the effect of a 6-8% increase in the cost of liability insurance on liner freight rate
comes to only about 0.2% (.03 x .06) or 0.4% (.05 x .08). If the insurance cost portion of total
liner freight is assumed to be 10% and this cost is increased by 15%, its effect on total liner
freight comes to 1.5%. Reynardson, supra note 3, at 16. It has also been asserted that the
question of whether carriers raise their freight rates to cover their increased P&I insurance costs
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to generalize the effects that these three rules have on overall insurance
costs. Double insurance will be burdensome to the cargo owner in the
end, and this will dampen the vitality of international trade and the efficient
allocation of international resources. Therefore, the liability between the
carrier and the shipper should be distributed in a way to minimize double
insurance - keeping in mind in any case that it will be hard to avoid the
double insurance problem because both the liability insurer and the cargo
insurer must pay administrative costs or current expenses. We should
evaluate the distribution of liability between the carrier and the shipper
from this point of view.
With these difficulties in mind, this paper will examine the
theoretical effects of the application of the Hamburg Rules on both liability
insurance and cargo insurance and then explore potential implications by
means of face-to-face interviews with concerned parties. This article will
not attempt to provide definitive answers to these questions, for that would
require greater statistical groundwork than what is currently available.
II. CARGO INSURANCE UNDER THE HAMBURG RULES
Sea carriage depends on two types of insurance, namely cargo
insurance and carrier's liability insurance. These are similar in that they
both cover risks on loss or damage during sea carriage. They are different
with respect to the contracting parties and the risks to the insured. Liability
insurance covers carrier liability for loss or damage during carriage, while
cargo insurance covers economic losses resulting from loss or damage to
the goods.' However, they constitute an overlapping system of insurance
in the sense that they cover the same goods. Costs related to claims
investigation, administration, and litigation likewise overlap in these two
different types of policy. Though not widely recognized, the overlapping
insurance problem existed before the Hamburg Rules were concluded.
Almost all cargo loss or damage is ultimately paid either by the
cargo insurer or the carrier's liability insurer (to be precise, either type is
paid by four parties, including the cargo interests and the carrier). The
uncertainty about compensation for loss or damage to shipped cargoes
during the voyage may be eliminated by having the carrier assume absolute
liability. Another alternative is having the shipper assume all liability for
will depend on the particular competitive situation of the carrier. That is, although one cannot
generalize, it may be that there are many cases where carriers will not raise their rates to
recapture the entire increase in P&I costs. Under such conditions, on the whole, the shift in
burden from cargo insurers to P&I insurer should, in itself, have little effect on world shipping.
See Robert Hellawell, Allocation of Risk Between Cargo Owner and Carrier, 27 AM. J. COMP.
L., 357, 366-67 (1979); Hellawell, supra note 3, at 211-16.
7. There is one case in which cargo insurance covers third-party liability. This is
provided by the Collision Clause of the Institute Cargo Clauses of 1982.
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loss or damage. However, it is unlikely that such a method would be
accepted as practical.'
To complicate matters further, even though shifting the risk to
each of the two contracting parties would eliminate dual insurance, it does
not always result in savings against total costs, whether from the point of
view of the cargo owner or from that of the total society. If the cargo
owner bears responsibility for all cargo damage, cargo insurance becomes
more important than liability insurance, and hence liability insurance could
be eliminated. This could result in savings in the P&I costs of
administration, claims investigation, and subrogation recoveries, as well as
P&I calls. However, it is uncertain whether the cargo owner is benefited
by such cost saving, since it depends on changes in the freight rate and
cargo insurance premium. One important issue relevant to this question
may be whether carriers will be able to pass on the costs of P&I insurance
to shippers through higher freight rates. Predictions are divided regarding
this. Opponents of the Hamburg Rules generally assert that carriers must
pass on any cost increase if they are to stay in business.9 Supporters, on
the other hand, consider the issue more complicated and argue that carriers
may not pass on higher costs.'o "Comparing the relative expense of cargo
insurance and P&I insurance undoubtedly requires empirical evidence, for
there are plausible reasons why either could be found less expensive.""
On the other hand, if the carrier bears responsibility for all cargodamage and possible decrease in costs' 2 turn out to be more than the
8. The insured bill of lading attempted by OCL (Overseas Container, Ltd.) and ACT
(Associated Container Transportation, Ltd.) was not successfiul because the large cargo owners
rejected it. That was due to the fact that the savings in premiums resulting from insuring large
goods through cargo insurance was greater than that resulting from the insured bill of lading.
See G. Tantin, Les Documents de Transport Combing, 15 EUR. TRANS. L. 377-78 (1980). That
is, insured bill of lading would provide all shippers with standard coverage at an average cost,
and large shippers do not like this. They prefer to arrange insurance coverage consistent with the
needs of the particular business activity involved and thus to obtain advantages regarding claim
settlements, premiums and other benefits that insurers offer important customers or that a
customer with a good claims record may want. It has been suggested that a more practical way
to approach this problem would be to develop understandings between cargo insurers and
shipowner-liability insurers whereby formulae are agreed upon in advance for the allocation of
loss in specified categories of claims, with non recourse agreements backing up those formulae
so that the cargo insurer will not attempt to recover from the liability insurer amounts in excess
of what would be provided therein. It has also been indicated that costs would be incurred in
investigating the claims and in assessing quanta. At least the costs of litigation would be
reduced, however, and in this way one of the main potential disadvantages of the adoption and
application of the Hamburg Rules would be avoided or mitigated.
9. See supra note 3.
10. See supra note 2.
11. Sturley, supra note 1, at 147.
12. It is asserted that as cargo insurance is a highly competitive business, premiums would
go down as payments from P&I clubs increase simply because the cargo insurance companies'net
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increase in costs in P&I calls and freights, it is theoretically plausible that
cargo owners will have some benefits under that regime. However, even
if cargo owners have such benefits, there is no practical way for them to
select the range of coverage to take advantage of favorable premiums.
Additionally, a number of problems can arise because cargo owners have
to make claims directly to liability insurers for loss or damage. In short,
there is no reason to expect that the covered risks of the cargo insurer will
be reduced substantially.
Consequently, some degree of double insurance is unavoidable
under the Hamburg Rules. This fact is apparent upon examination of the
provisions of the Rules that follow, although there may be no practical
problem for the shipper to be compensated for loss or damage from the
carrier according to the provisions of the Hamburg Rules.
A. Basis of Liability
Carrier liability under Article 5(1) of the Hamburg Rules 13 is based
on the principle of presumed fault or neglect. This provision is heavily
influenced by the language used in conventions concerning the international
transport of cargo by air,' 4 rail,' 5 and road 6 carriage. According to this
payments will go down. Selvig, supra note 2, at 316; Hellawell, supra note 6, at 366-67.
Regarding the cost of recourse actions which should be taken into account in rating premiums,
the simplification of the liability regime in the Hamburg Rules is said to be likely to facilitate
recourse to such an extent that one may even expect an actual reduction in recourse cost. It has
also been indicated that cargo companies are hardly expected to seek recourse in cases where the
cost will be unreasonably high. Selvig, supra note 2, at 316. In addition, it has been asserted
that if the ratio of claims administration to recoveries is increased (mainly due to the increase in
recourse actions between two insurers), it would be temporary, reflecting only the inevitable
period of uncertainty, which occurs whenever any new measure is introduced, whether it be a
statute, a convention or a technological advance. C. C. Nicoll, Do the Hamburg Rules Suit a
Shipper Dominated Economy?, 24 J. MAR. L. & COM. 1, 170-77 (1993).
13. Article 5(1) provides that:
[tihe carrier is liable for loss resulting from loss or damage to the goods, as well as
from delay in delivery, if the occurrence which caused the loss, damage or delay took
place while the goods were in his charge as defined in Article 4, unless the carrier
proves that he, his servants or agents took all measures that could reasonably be
required to avoid the occurrence and its consequences.
UN COGSA, supra note 2.
The former part of Article 5(1) gives strict liability to the carrier, while the latter part permits the
carrier an exclusion by requiring him to take all measures that could reasonably be required to
assure safe delivery. In the clause above, the exact level of care required of the carrier is open to
future determination, since the language "took all measures that could reasonably be required" is
novel in the area of carriage of goods by sea. Hellawell, supra note 6, at 358.
14. Articles 18-(1) and 20-(1) of the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
Relating to International Carriage by Air October 12, 1929 478 U.N.T.S. 371 [hereinafter The
Warsaw Convention]. The Warsaw Convention applies only to international carriage, which is
defined as that taking place between two contracting states, or occurring within a single
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clause, the carrier is not liable for loss resulting from loss or damage to the
goods unless the occurrence which caused the loss or damage took place
while the goods were in his charge. Compensation from the carrier is
uncertain if it is impossible to explain the cause of such loss or damage
because there is no provision for determining who is responsible for
liability in such a case. Moreover, there is a certain amount of ambiguity
in Article 5(1) as to whether the shipper is responsible for proving that the
cause of the loss took place while the goods were under the carrier's
custody, or whether the carrier is responsible for proving that the cause of
the loss had arisen before the goods were in his custody when the clean bill
of lading was issued.
The carrier is not liable for any loss if there is no fault or
negligence on his part or on the part of his servants or agents according to
the principle of fault or neglect. However, some level of cargo damage is
nearly inevitable in sea carriage, even where the carrier has taken all
measures that could reasonably be taken to avoid it. Some level of cargo
damage might be considered almost an inevitable price of international
commerce, even though the level of damage is still subject to some degree
contracting state if there is an agreed-upon stopping place outside it. Id. art. 1(1), (2). With
respect to the basis of liability, the carrier under the Warsaw Convention is presumed liable upon
simple proof of damage or loss to the cargo, in line with the general rule. Id. art. 18(1). The
major exceptions to liability, and the air carrier's major defense, are contained in Article 20(1).
15. Articles 27-(l) and 27-(2) of the International Convention Concerning the Carriage of
Goods by Rail (May 9, 1980) <http://www.unicc.org/unece/trade/cotif/cotif09.htm>
[hereinafter CIM]. The scope of the CIM may be summarized in terms of three criteria: (1) the
convention applies only to international carriage between at least two contracting states; (2) the
shipment must be covered by a single transport document, in the approved form, which covers
the entire carriage; and (3) the shipment must be carried only on lines registered on official lists.
Id. art. I(1). The convention applies from the time the goods are accepted for delivery until the
time of delivery. Id. art. 27(1). The liability system under the convention has been assessed to
be based on absolute liability, strict liability (droit strict) or liability ex recepts (system of liability
without fault). Zamora, supra note 2, at 424, which is provided in Article 27(1). Under the
CIM there are two classes of exceptions to liability. Under one class of exceptions, termed non-
privileged exceptions, the burden of proof is on the carrier to establish that one of these
exceptions caused the damage or loss. CIM, supra note 15, arts. 27(2), 28(1). Under the other
class of exceptions, termed privileged exceptions, the carrier's burden of proof is applied
favorably. Id. art. 27(3). That is, the carrier needs only show that the loss or damage could
have been caused by one of these risks, in which case it shall be presumed that the damage or
loss was so caused.
16. Articles 17-(1) and 17-(2) of the Convention on the Contract for International Carriage
of Goods by Road (Geneva, May 19, 1956) <http://www.anase.irv. uit.notrade/law/doc/UN.
CMR. Road.Carriage.Convention.1956.html10/21/97> [hereinafter CMR]. The CMR applies
to every contract for the carriage of goods by road in vehicles for reward, when transport takes
place between two countries, at least one of which is a contracting country, which can be applied
by contractual agreement when it would not be applied by default. Id. art 1(1). The basic
feature of the regime is a presumption of liability against the carrier once the cargo owner has
established the fact of the loss or damage. Id. art. 17(1). The carrier's liability depends on the
exceptions available to the carrier to rebut the presumption against it. Id. art. 17(2).
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of control. If carriers were willing to take all necessary precautions, we
could have international commerce with little to negligible cargo damage.
But possibilities of loss or damage still remain due to other causes, such as
by inherent vice or nature, 7 latent defect, unavoidable fire, third parties'
cargo, war, strikes, etc. Precautions may far exceed the value of almost
any cargo carried by sea. Thus, contracting parties make a conscious
decision to tolerate some level of cargo damage in order to save in the
overall costs of the enterprise operation.
We recognize that there are vague provisions about the placement
of liability in the Hamburg Rules. Some losses are inevitable. Substantial
losses during sea carriage are commercially predictable. Therefore, cargo
owners might bear some of the risk under the Hamburg Rules as they do
under the Hague-Visby Rules, and they will need to purchase cargo
insurance just the same.' 8
B. Period of Liability
The carrier's period of liability under the Hamburg Rules (Article
4) is based on the port-to-port criteria, which impose a duty of care on the
carrier while he is in charge of the goods, from receipt to delivery. It
replaces the old tackle-to-tackle limitation of carrier liability. However,
cargo should be delivered to the departing port or inland depot and stored
at a place of storage before it is under the custody of the carrier. If the
cargo insurance covers all risks from warehouse to warehouse, 9 the cargo
insurer compensates the cargo owner for loss or damage regardless of the
17. Inherent vice or nature of the goods is covered under a cargo insurance policy by the
special or expressed clauses - including, for example, the rust clause, the standard coal clause,
the livestock clause, or the clause involving risks of rats and/or vermin - which require the
insurer's due diligence or reasonable measures to avoid such risks for the indemnification from
the insurer.
18. Even under cargo insurance there are exclusionary risks such as willful misconduct of
the assured, delay (delay is excluded even if the delay is caused by a peril insured against),
ordinary wear and tear, ordinary leakage and breakage, inherent vice or nature of the subject
matter insured, and rats/vermin, under the United Kingdom's Marine Insurance Act of 1906 and
under the Institute Cargo Clauses (A) of 1982. See Section 55(2) of the Marine Insurance Act of
1906; Clause 4 of the Institute Cargo Clauses (A). In current practice there is also the category
of cargo loss or damage for which neither the carrier nor the cargo insurer is liable, such as loss
or damage caused by the purely inherent vice or nature of the cargo or willful misconduct of the
assured.
19. In cargo insurance, which is developed in accordance with the various demands of the
insured, the duration of risk regulated in the United Kingdom's Marine Insurance Act of 1906
from loading at the departure port to discharging at the destination port - is expanded by the
transit clause or the warehouse-to-warehouse clause. For example, in the Institute Cargo Clauses
of 1982 (Clause 8), the duration of risk is from the time the goods leave the warehouse or place
of storage at the place named in the policy for the commencement of the transit to the time the
goods are to be delivered to the consignees' warehouse or other final warehouse or place of
storage at the destination named therein.
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carriage section in which the loss or damage occurs, or even if the cause of
loss or damage cannot be proved. Without cargo insurance, the cargo
owner may encounter difficulty in attempting to show that the cause of loss
or damage occurred while the cargo was in the carrier's custody.
Therefore, under the Hamburg Rules, cargo insurance is still necessary,
although the carrier's period of liability is extended.20
C. Package Limitation
Much discussion has taken place about the increase in the monetary
limit of liability under the Hamburg Rules. The Hamburg Rules provide
for a nominal increase of about twenty-five percent in the monetary limit
by comparison with the Hague-Visby Rules.21 However, it is unimportant
to the cargo owner or carrier whether the carrier's limits of liability in
international conventions are high enough or are excessively low because
the limitation exists merely to create some certainty in commercial
relations.22 Moreover, the shipper can be provided compensation that is
.considered sufficient, over and above the limitation of the carrier's
liability, in accordance with the specific provisions of the agreement with
20. The carrier's liability under the Hamburg Rules may be said to be strengthened when
one considers the fact that the probability of occurrence of loss or damage from the stage of
receipt of the cargo for transportation to the stage of shipment is high compared to other stages of
transportation. But in some countries (e.g., the United States or France) the carrier's extended
period of liability has been realized to incorporation into the bill of lading. Such an extension of
the carrier's period of liability is helped less by the Hamburg Rules than the Hague or Hague-
Visby Rules.
21. The Hague Rules have a limit of £100 per package or unit, which has led to wide
variation in calculating the limitation figure. The Hague-Visby Rules, as amended by the 1979
Protocol, provide for a limit of 666.67 SDR per package or 2 SDR per kilo, whichever is
greater. Under the Hamburg Rules the limits are 835 units of account per package or other
shipping unit or 2.5 units of account per kilogram of gross weight of the goods, whichever is
greater. This nominal increase of about 25%, which could hardly be interpreted as generous to
cargo owners, is assessed to represent a substantial reduction in the limits of a carrier's liability
in real terms when inflation is taken into account. This is said to be contrasted with the much
more generous levels fixed by the other conventions, for example, the CMR, whose Article 23
provides for a limit of 8.33 SDRs per kilogram (together with all the costs of carriage). A. J.
Waldron, The Hamburg Rules:A Boondoggle for Lawyers?, J. BUS. L. 313-14, n.41 (1991).
22. See C. W. H. Goldie, Effect of the Hamburg Rules on Shipowners' Liability Insurance,
24 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 113 (1993). The package limitation was asserted not to be substantially
meaningful due to one of the following reasons. First, the limit of liability in terms of real
values has nearly always varied greatly among Hague Rules countries. Extremes are exemplified
by Spain with a low of $62 and Switzerland with a high of $1455 per package. These differences
are due themselves to the fact that legislation in most Hague Rules countries has fixed the amount
in national currency and monetary developments during the past 40 to 50 years have resulted in
quite different outcomes for the currencies of the various countries. Second, the concepts of
package and unit, one element of the limit of liability, has also been understood in different
ways. This has greatly affected the actual limit to be applied in particular cases. Selvig, supra
note 2, at 321.
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the carrier. 23  The shipper simply has to choose between the security of
having full recovery guaranteed from the carrier who agrees to cover such
costs with higher freight or the purchase of excess cargo insurance, and the
greater risk entailed by keeping within standard liability ,limits.
Considering that compensation from the carrier is commonly delayed and
compensation procedures are somewhat complicated, the shipper would do
well to insure the goods by purchasing cargo insurance for prompt and full
compensation. In light of this, the necessity to insure goods by means of
cargo insurance will continue to exist regardless of the expansion of the
carrier's liability limitation.
D. Other Clauses
Where fault or neglect on the part of the carrier, his servants, or
agents only causes lart of the loss, damage or delay in delivery, the carrier
is liable only to the extent that it is attributable to such fault or neglect.2'
In such a case it will tend to take considerable time to investigate the loss
23. Cases are common in which claims clearly exceed the limitation figure, which was
defined as a mere reflection of relative economic power between the two interests, the carriers
and the shippers, more than of commercial need. It seems inevitable that the courts will find a
way to break the limitation in order to provide the claimant with what is considered to be
adequate compensation. See Goldie, supra note 22, at 114. One method whereby United States
courts circumvent the limitation has been to insist that the shipper be given a fair opportunity to
declare the true value of the goods when it is higher than the package limitation. Blank square
clauses in bills of lading, published tariffs giving the shipper a choice of valuations, and
incorporation by reference to the short-form bill of lading of the terms of the long-form bill of
lading (which refers to COGSA) have been accepted by American courts as fair opportunities.
The principle of a fair opportunity to declare has arisen in Canada also. Another method has been
to define the package as a smaller and smaller unit by ruling that each package in the container,
rather than the container itself, is a package. This legislative approach, which has been called the
judicial response to an anachronistic law, is described in GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW
FOR THE AGES (1982) and by many other authors cited in WILLIAM, TETLEY, MARINE CARGO
CLAIMS 866-67 (3d ed. 1988). Also, when the carrier commits a deviation, most United States
courts do not apply package limitations according to the doctrines of deviation and fundamental
breach. See, e.g., Constructors T~cnicos, S. de R. L. v. Sea-Land Service, Inc., 945 F.2d 841,
844-45, 1992 AMC 1284, 1289 (5th Cir. 1991); Ingersoll Milling Machine Co. v. M/V Bodena,
829 F.2d 293-301, 1988 AMC 223, 234 (2nd Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1042 (1988);
English Electric Co. v. S.S. Nancy Lykes, 706 F.2d 84-89, 1987 AMC 1351, 1358 (2nd Cir.
1987); General Electric Co. v. S.S. Nancy Lykes, 706 F.2d 80, 86-88, 1983 AMC 1947, 1957-
59 (2nd Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 849 (1983); Nemeth v. General Steamship Corp., 694
F.2d 609, 612-13, 1983 AMC 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1982); Calmapuip Engineering West
Hemisphere Corp. v. S/S Yafo, 590 F.2d 633, 638, 1984 AMC 839, 846 (5th Cir. 1979). But
see Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co. v. Poseidon Schiffahrt Gmb.H., 313 F.2d 872, 874-75, 1963
AMC 665, 668-69 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 819 (1963). In continental countries,
in contrast with common law countries, the limitation clause has not been applied to damage
caused by the intent or gross negligence of the carrier, but rather the question of whether the
carrier may limit liability for damage caused by such fault of his servant or agent has been solved
in different ways. Selvig, supra note 2, at 321.
24. Articles 5-7 of the Hamburg Rules. U.N. COGSA, supra note 2.
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or damage to ascertain the carrier's portion of liability, even though the
carrier is proved liable for a substantial part of the total loss incurred.
Therefore, even though the carrier indemnifies cargo interests, it will not
necessarily be an advantage to the shipper who is interested in rapid
reimbursement. For a prompt return, it would be more efficient for the
shipper to receive indemnification from the cargo insurer and then to
transfer the claims against the carrier to the cargo insurer. 25
The universality of the new standard of carrier's liability and
burden of proof is undercut by special rules about losses to fire.26 In the
case in which it is interpreted as shifting the burden of proof back to the
shipper, the above clause makes it practically impossible for the cargo
owner to establish the source of the fire during the voyage because the
carrier may be the only party knowledgeable of any accidents that have
occurred during the voyage.
In view of this, the cargo owner still needs to insure goods by
means of cargo insurance against loss or damage arising from fire in order
to guarantee compensation. Thus, the necessity to insure goods through
marine cargo insurance would not be mitigated under the Hamburg Rules
during the period of enforcement, even though it would be reduced more
or less in the long run under the condition that prompt and full
compensation from the carrier is secured, such as from the cargo insurer.
III. LIABILITY INSURANCE UNDER THE HAMBURG RULES
To date, the matter of double insurance has mainly been discussed
under the assumption that the Hamburg Rules would strengthen the liability
25. In practice,
a loan receipt could be applied, which is an arrangement between the shipper and his
insurer whereby the latter lends the shipper the amount of the loss caused by the
carrier's negligence, in consideration of the shipper's agreement (a) to take suit against
the carrier at the expense and direction of the insurer, and (b) to pay over any eventual
recovery to the insurer. This loan receipt, rather than subrogation receipt, is often
used by American underwriters so that the claim is technically and theoretically
unsettled and yet the underwriter, under the terms of the loan receipt and the insurance
policy, may sue in the name of the insured.
William Tetley, Who May Claim or Sue for Cargo Loss or Damage?, 17 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 2,
171-72 (1986).
26. Article 5.4(a) of the Hamburg Rules provides that the carrier is only liable for the loss
of, or damage caused to, goods, or delay in their delivery, caused by fire if the claimant proves
that the fire arose from the fault or neglect of the carrier or his servants or agents. The failure to
employ the formula "all measures that could reasonably be taken," as in the case of other loss or
damage and specifying instead fault or neglect as the criterion for liability gives rise to the
question of whether the effect of Article 5.4(a) is purely to reverse the burden of proof or has a
more substantive effect upon the standard of the carrier's care.
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of the carrier.2' Now this article will examine the effects that
strengthening a carrier's liability has on liability insurance and costs.
There has also been a great deal of discussion on the increase in monetary
limits of carrier liability, as well as on the potential increase in the amount
of litigation that is likely to arise due to ambiguity in the provisions and the
removal of the lists of exceptions under the Hamburg Rules. The latter
will affect shipowner's liability insurance demand and cost.
Irrespective of whether the increased package limitations discussed
above should be of any concern,28 it is unlikely that any such increase will
have a dramatic effect on shipowner's liability insurance under the
Hamburg Rules. There have been many disputes in the courts related to
this, but interpretations of the relevant clauses in the Hague Rules have
been continuously invoked to settle them for seventy years.29 it seems
likely, therefore, that the volume of litigation involving the interpretation
of the clauses will increase insofar as the principle of interpretation
changes according to changing circumstances.
But it is not enough to show that there will be an increase in
litigation because of the adoption of the Hamburg Rules. Under the
Hamburg Rules, the carriers are primarily anxious about restrictions on the
27. Of course, there are some authors who see the Hamburg Rules as reducing the
carrier's liability. Tetley, supra note 4, at 17.
28. Examples of this trend may be found in the Conventions on Limitation of Liability for
Maritime Claims, such as the Convention on Limitation of Carrier's Liability, effected in
December 1986, and the Athens Convention Relating to the Carriage of Passengers and their
Luggage by Sea, effected in April 1987. The former increased the liability limitation by 140%
or more, while the latter increased the liability limitation by 25% for cargo in the hold, 67% for
automobiles, including luggage, and 12.5% for other cargoes, compared to the Convention of
1957. Moreover, shipowners like Matson Navigation in the United States voluntarily increased
the limitation to U.S.$1000 per package. John Betz, Anchors Aweigh for the Hamburg Rules?,
DISTRIBUTION, Feb. 1992, at 54.
29. Opponents of the Hague Rules have proffered arguments that ambiguity in the Rules
will lead to expensive and unproductive litigation. This is similar to opponents' arguments
against the Hamburg Rules regarding interpretation. See, e.g., Relating to the Carriage of
Goods by Sea: Hearings before the House Committee on Merchant Marine & Fisheries, 68th
Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1925) (statement of Norman Drapper), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY SEA ACT AND THE TRAVAUX PRIPARATOIRES OF THE HAGUE
RULES 716, 239-40 (1990); Relating to the Carriage of Goods by Sea: Hearings before the House
Committee on the Merchant Marine & Fisheries, 67th Cong., 4th Sess. 91 (1923) (statement of
C. B. Heinemann). Until somewhat recent years there have been two opposite points of view
about ambiguity in the Hague Rules. Some commentators have asserted that the Hague Rules
have worked well in practice and have provided a considerable degree of certainty, especially in
dealing with cargo claims, which is the most important part of the provisions of the Rules. See
John C. Moore, The Hamburg Rules, 10 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 2 (1978-1979); Honour, supra
note 3, at 239. Other opponents have asserted that some provisions are uncertain and differ in
the interpretation of the Rules. See Kurt GrCnfors, The Hamburg Rules: Failure or Success?, J.
BUS. L. 334 (1978); SAMIR MANKABADY, THE HAMBURG RULES ON THE CARRIAGE OF GOODS
BY SEA 30, 114 (1978), cited in Selvig, The Hamburg Rules, supra note 2, at 302.
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defenses which are available to them by removal of the catalogues of
exception of the Hague-Visby Rules. Shipowners have little opportunity to
prevent or manage risk during the voyage in most countries, and
companies, and the extent to which shipowners do indeed have control
over short deliveries or damage to shipped cargoes during a given voyage
varies from country to country and among carriers' companies. 3°
In spite of the fact that the defenses available to the carrier through
the exception catalogues have tended in practice to be interpreted
restrictively under the Hague or Hague-Visby Rules, 3' the removal of those
defenses under the Hamburg Rules might weaken the shipowner's position
because the court will not consider the exceptions. 32 Hence, an increase in
carrier liability through the removal of exceptions would result in an
increase in demand for carrier liability insurance. Nevertheless, it is not
likely that an increase in carrier liability due to a removal of exceptions
under the Hague-Visby Rules will result in an equivalent increase in the
liability insurance premium. Carrier liability insurance covers many kinds
of risks, and one cannot predict with any confidence that an increase in
some cost factors will be fully reflected in the total cost of liability
insurance.
From the point of view of pure economics, the P&I club could be
assessed to be more efficient and prone to undertake cost-saving measures
30. For example, some companies whose risk management operations are run by a skilled,
well-educated staff and crew will more easily be able to prevent short delivery or damage to
goods during a voyage, while companies that fail to manage risk efficiently will have much more
difficulty doing so. So if we want to assess the effect of the application of the Hamburg Rules,
we should do it country by country and company by company. See Goldie, supra note 22, at
112.
31. According to the Hague Rules:
this means that in many countries it is increasingly difficult for the carrier to prove the
exercise of due diligence in making the ship seaworthy, and it is even more difficult
for him to rely on some of the exceptions listed in Article 4 Rule 2, and it is also more
difficult for him to rely on (b) Fire, (c) Perils of the Sea, (i) Act or omission of the
shipper, etc., (in) Inherent vice, (p) Latent defects, or (q) Any other cause arising
without the actual fault or privity of the carrier, his servants or agents.
Id.
32. Id. at 113-14.
33. Cargo liabilities are reported to amount to between 1/3 and 2/5 of all claims made.
Selvig, supra note 2, at 317. The Hamburg Rules' effect on liability insurance has been assessed
to be too limited because the portion of actual accidents out of the risks insured by the P&I clubs
was reported to be not so large (that is, 30%) and because the provisions of the Hamburg Rules
are related to cargo liabilities among many kinds of liabilities. Reynardson, supra note 3, at 1.
Thus, if the claim amount is increased by 10% to 20%, the total claim amount paid to carriers
will be increased by 3% to 6%.
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than the profit-pursuing cargo insurance companies.34 Hence, it is possible
that carriers may be insured more inexpensively through a P&I club than if
insured through a cargo insurance company, especially in a world of
perfect information and zero transaction costs.35 Granted, it is very
difficult to predict the effect of the Hamburg Rules on the total cost of
insurance without some empirical support, but it is highly doubtful that
activation of the Rules will bring about any increase in total insurance costs
as opponents have asserted, if the shift from marine cargo insurance to
carrier liability insurance is a smooth one.
To summarize, this article has examined the effect of the Hamburg
Rules on liability insurance in this section. While the effect on increased
demand seems somewhat substantial, the liability insurance premium does
not seem quite so dramatic. Nevertheless, we cannot draw any definitive
conclusions about this without better information.36
34. Some investigations made in 1979 showed that the portion of total claims that
constitutes the operating cost of the P&I club is estimated to be 3.5%, Reynardson, supra note 3,
at 4, and 85% to 90% of the total premium is estimated as constituting actual claims. Selvig,
supra note 2, at 316. According to one United States report about 50% of cargo insurance
companies' premium receipts was estimated as constituting claim amounts, while about 33%
went to general operating costs. The rest constituted company profits. Cargo Liability Study,
FINAL REPORT, PREPARED BY OFFICE OF FACILITATION, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT
SECRETARY FOR ENVIRONMENT, SAFETY, AND CONSUMER AFFAIRS, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 65 (June 1975). In the case of the European cargo
insurance companies, 75% of total premium receipts was estimated as constituting claim
amounts, 20% as general operating costs, and 5% as profits. N. Kihlbom, The Hague Rules and
the UNC1TRL Draft, SCANDINAVIAN INS. Q. 32, 34 (1977).
35. See Sturley, supra note 1, at 125. There are some contrary assertions that P&I
insurance is generally more expensive than cargo insurance. See, e.g., Chenal, supra note 3, at
915, n.144; M. J. Shah, The Revision of the Hague Rules on Bills of Lading Within the UN
System: Key Issues in the Hamburg Rules on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, at 11, n.5 (1978);
Hellawell, supra note 3, at 367. See also comments by Germany, VII Yearbook 218-19;
comments by Sweden, id. at 230-31; International Maritime Committee, id, at 249; International
Union of Marine Insurance, id, at 257; comments by Japan, id, at 221-22. One reason is that
cargo insurance spreads the risk of a major catastrophe broadly, among all the cargo insurance
companies or underwriters involved on the navigation, while P&I insurance concentrates that risk
on a single policy. See, e.g., N.R. McGilchrist, The New Hague Rules, LLOYD'S MAR. & COM.
L. Q. 260 (1974). Another is that first-party property insurance is more economical than third-
party liability insurance. See, e.g., U.N. COGSA, supra note 2, at 235 (comments of the
Japanese representative). From the point of view of risk combination and diversion, insurance
companies' underwriting methods and premium imposition are more efficient and scientific than
those of the P&I club, considering the relatively large volume of underwriting and long-
established experience of the underwriters. But it is not reasonable to conclude that liability
insurance is costlier than cargo insurance if we consider this point alone and do not consider the
total operating costs of the two industries.
36. There are two examples of empirical studies on the effect of the Hamburg Rules on
liability insurance. One was done by the forwarder associations of the United Kingdom and the
other by C. W. H. Goldie. The major freight forwarder associations of the United Kingdom
made the new standard clauses about the carrier's liability. Instead of the actual principle of non
liability, according to which the shipper is responsible for proving the carrier's negligence, these
1997] Sup Lee 167
IV. EXPLORATION OF THE EFFECT OF THE HAMBURG RULES: FIELD
PRACTITIONERS' EXPECTATIONS
The purpose of this exploration is to introduce an understanding of
the effects of Hamburg Rules from the perspective of business practitioners
involved in international trade, that is, international traders as cargo
interests and carriers. A more complete understanding of the effects of
Hamburg Rules is likely to be obtained by scrutinizing both theoretical
explication and field practitioner opinion. Because the main purpose of the
Hamburg Rules is to regulate the business practices of carriers involved in
international trade, opinions from the field should be regarded at least as
important as what academicians theorize.
Firsthand information from industry practitioners was collected by
means of a series of face-to-face interviews with personnel working for
either trading companies or shipping companies located in Korea.37
Interviewees included company presidents, directors, and other authorities
in charge of their firms' decisions concerning insurance and carriage
contracts regulating the importation and exportation of goods. In order to
obtain both broad and in-depth information, a set of unstructured, open-
ended questions was presented in each of the 231 one-on-one interviews
clauses adopt the new limitation of liability, which has substantially been strengthened. This
means that the carrier's liability has been more strengthened than it would have been under the
Hamburg Rules. However, it has been observed by the business world that freight rates have not
gone up and the major freight forwarders have not been required to pay higher premiums for
liability insurance than under the previous system. M. D. Booker, European Shippers View on
the Hamburg/Visby Controversy, Paper Presented to the Shippers National Freight Claims
Council at its 13th National Conference at New Orleans (Mar. 4, 1987), cited by United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development, supra note 33, at 34. On the other hand, C. W. H.
Goldie examined the possible impact of the Hamburg Rules on liability insurance in 1993. His
study showed that the effect of the Hamburg Rules on shipowner's liability insurance would not
be notably dramatic. Goldie, supra note 22, at 115-16.
37. As an example from this empirical study, Korea was assumed to lie between the
shipping developed countries like the United States and the shipping developing countries like
those that have yet to ratify the Hamburg Rules. That would place Korea at around the tenth
largest country in volume of foreign trade and the twelfth largest in volume of shipping space in
the world. Consequently, Korea's adoption or rejection of the Rules may or may not be
indicative of the decisions of other countries. But the effect of the Rules on marine cargo
insurance and shipowner's liability insurance in Korea would be even less indicative of broader
trends created by the Rules than the question of their adoption. Perusing the results of the
interviews, we should consider the general state of the circumstances surrounding Korea's
insurance and shipping industries with those of other advanced countries. For example, in
Korea, marine cargo insurers usually use the premiums made in other insurance-advanced
countries as benchmarks in setting their rates rather than using completely independent criteria.
Almost all Korean shipping companies have very weak competitive positions compared to
shipping-advanced countries, and it may be somewhat restrictive for them to estimate freight
according to the market mechanism. These factors may obstruct our ability to generalize
concerning the general effect of the Hamburg Rules on marine cargo insurance and the
shipowner's liability insurance.
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with trading company authorities and fifty with shipping company
authorities. These questions included:
1) whether the Hamburg Rules are likely to change the informant's
firm's insurance purchasing behavior;
2) whether the Hamburg Rules are likely to affect the premiums of
the insurance the informant's firm purchases; and
3) how the informant's firm would respond or is responding to the
changes brought about by the Hamburg Rules.
Interviews were conducted during the period from August 1993 to August
1996.
Informants were evaluated based on the adequacy of their
knowledge of and willingness to provide the information. All informants
were familiar with the Hamburg Rules and the potential effects of the
Rules on their businesses. In Korea, carrier liability has been strengthened
substantially by the modification of the International Sea Carriage Law in
1992, which incorporated ideas from the Hague-Visby Rules and, to a
lesser extent, from the Hamburg Rules. Informants were aware of on the
implications of those modifications, which had significantly increased
carrier's liability marine cargo. In addition, all informants were willing to
provide information. During the interview period, the author was in
charge of Advanced Management Programs at Pusan National University,
where the authorities of the affronted trading and shipping companies had
been educated. A one-on-one interview, lasting an average of about forty-
five minutes, was conducted in either a seminar room or in the author's
office at the University.
The procurement of information from two major parties involved
in international trade helped clarify the field practitioners' perceptions of
the Hamburg Rules and the expected influences by the Rules on their
insurance-related businesses. Considering the diversity of propositions that
are provided in the literature on the issue, the opinions of these business
practitioners were surprisingly similar. Findings are summarized based
upon the interviews with the traders and then with the carriers. Finally,
the information from both categories of informant is integrated to discuss
the overall effects of the Hamburg Rules on marine cargo insurance and
shipowner's liability insurance.
A. Traders' Responses
The Hamburg Rules will not change cargo insurance practices.
More than ninety percent of informants representing trading companies
expressed a need to insure the goods they export and import regardless of
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increased carrier liability on those shipped goods. Trading companies in
general seem to trust insurance companies rather than either shipping
companies or P&I clubs to provide prompt and full compensation for lost
or damaged goods. Surprisingly, most trading companies are reluctant to
contact shipping companies to make claims for the loss or damage of their
goods incurred during voyage. Shipping companies in most cases were
reported to be substantially unresponsive in compensating the shipper for
lost or damaged goods, even when causes are clearly attributable to the
carrier. Trading companies seem to be motivated to resort to insurance
companies rather than to shipping companies.38 The working relationship
with an insurance company resulting from accumulated transactions
provides international traders with not only trustworthy relief but also
fringe benefits such as discounted insurance premiums. Thus, because
international trading companies perceive cargo insurance as a better
alternative than the compensation plan available at shipping companies, an
increase in carriers' liability imposed by the Hamburg Rules would not
significantly alter the practice of marine cargo insurance among
international traders. 3
As far as the possible change in cargo insurance premium is
concerned, trading companies do not expect such a change in the
foreseeable future. Quite contrary to what many academicians have
proposed, business practitioners believe that cargo insurance premiums
would be minimally, if at all, affected by the increase in carriers' liability
on shipped cargo. Informants representing trading companies expected,
judging from their business experiences, that because cargo insurance
premium levels are determined by a multiplicity of factors, changes in a
38. Basically, they seemed to be very reluctant to expose themselves to possible confusion
over complicated procedures in making claims with shipping companies as well as to settle such
matters in court. In addition, the proportion of attorneys to total population is much lower in
Korea than in the United States. Therefore, very few trading companies have their own legal
advisors or counselors.
39. It may also be inferred from the cargo interests' conservative attitudes about their
business in relation to marine cargo insurance that the requirement to insure traded goods with
marine cargo insurance, irrespective of strengthening the carrier's liability, will continue for a
substantial period of time. For example, in Korea, the New Lloyd's Policy of 1982 for marine
cargo insurance with the Institute Cargo Clauses of 1982 (made by the Corporation of Lloyd's of
London and the Institute of London Underwriters) was introduced and used from 1983. See EUN
SUP LEE, MARINE INSURANCE 134-37 (1996). Its contents were reported to be very
understandable and convenient for Korean traders compared to the Lloyd's S.G. Policy of 1779
with the Institute Cargo Clauses of 1963. See id. However, until June 1996, the Lloyd's S.G.
Policy had been used. The author surmises from the above interviews with trading companies
that the Lloyd's S.G. Policy had, in fact, covered 50-60% of all insurance contracts made by
them in Korea for 13 years after the introduction of the New Lloyd's Policy. It seems to have
made little difference that it is far more difficult for Korean traders to understand the terms of the
Lloyd's S. G. Policy than those of the New Lloyd's Policy of 1982.
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single factor (that is, increased carriers' liability) would not be strong
enough to have an immediate effect on the premium level. A number of
informants added that it will take substantial time (at least ten years) before
the increase in carrier liability decreases the premiums on marine cargo
insurance.
B. Carriers' Response: Cost-Saving, not Freight Increase
Informants representing carrier companies also provided
information regarding the potential impact of the Hamburg Rules on their
businesses. According to them, the Hamburg Rules would have a strong
influence on their businesses in terms of how they impact on shipowner's
liability insurance. The increased carrier responsibility imposed by the
Rules would raise their costs because they will have to purchase more
liability insurance, and these additional costs, in turn, would alter their
business practices.
Many carrier company respondents indicated that they have
attempted to absorb the increased costs through cost-saving strategies
rather than by raising freight. These informants further explained that, due
to intensive competition among carriers, most Korean carriers are
discouraged from attempting to raise freight to make up for the increased
costs incurred by increased liability coverage. They would rather save in
other areas by resorting to reengineering, mark-up reduction, and service
reduction. Contrary to opponents' objections to the Rules that one finds in
the literature, therefore, the Hamburg Rules may not directly affect freight
levels, at least in the near future. In summary, the increase in carrier
liability by the Hamburg Rules is likely to result in market expansion for
the liability insurance industry and an increase in P&I calls. However,
freight levels are not likely to increase in the foreseeable future.
C. Overall Effects of the Hamburg Rules on the Insurance Industry
The effects of the Hamburg Rules on marine cargo insurance and
shipowner's liability insurance, inferring from the interview data, needs to
be evaluated from both long-term and short-term perspectives. In the long
term, the Hamburg Rules have the potential to induce a restructuring of
insurance practices among parties involved in international trade.
International traders are likely eventually to take advantage of the reduced
burden under the condition that they come to trust shipping companies to
render prompt and full compensation for lost or damaged goods. They
will not have to insure cargo as much as they do now. We can
consequently predict some shrinkage in the cargo insurance market in the
long run. On the other hand, increased carrier liability will result in the
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expansion of the liability insurance market, increasing the carriers' costs.
Eventually, freight levels will have to go up.
On the other hand, the Hamburg Rules are not likely to affect the
insurance industry in general in the foreseeable future. Current business
practices are not providing a viable ground for the Rules. International
traders, in particular, expressed resistance to the idea of pacing up their
business practices with the changes imposed by the Rules. Their insurance
purchasing behavior seems to be more influenced by existing business
customs than the new liability regime imposed by the Hamburg Rules.
Regardless of the increased liability on carriers, international traders are
likely to insure the goods they import and export. The Rules are not
expected to affect the Cargo insurance either. The area in which the
Hamburg Rules have an immediate influence seems to be the liability
insurance market. Facing increased liability, carriers will have to purchase
more liability insurance. A majority of carriers, however, will not be able
to charge additional freight because of intensive competition in the
industry. Freight levels will consequently not be directly affected by the
Hamburg Rules in the short term.
Overall, the Hamburg Rules may have a detrimental effect on
world trade in the short run due to the increased possibility of double
insurance. As long as international traders hesitate to rely on carrier
compensation plans, a cargo of shipped good has a greater chance of being
insured by both traders and carriers. The Hamburg Rules thus need to be
understood at best as not affecting and at worst as even exacerbating the
current practice of double insurance in the short term.4°
V. CONCLUSION
Resolving the problem of insurance costs depends on a number of
empirical conclusions. Consider, for example, the argument that cargo
40. Besides the effect of the Hamburg Rules on marine cargo insurance and shipowner's
liability insurance, the general economic benefits of the Hamburg Rules from the view point of
the shippers were recognized by the parties concerned in the interviews, viz., maximum amounts
of compensation from the carrier would increase. Recovery would be permissible when the
shipowner's negligence is the (proximate) cause of the loss, or for delay. Greater care of cargo
by the carriers or their agents could be expected. This observation is very similar to cargo
interests' contentions of other advanced countries like the United States, except with regard to the
matter of the cargo insurance premium. For example, William J. Augello, the Executive
Director, for the Transportation Claims & Protection Council, pointed out that the Hamburg
Rules would reduce the cost of international trade by lowering the cost of cargo insurance, in
addition to the above benefits. Augello also charged the marine insurance industry with
opposition to Hamburg because they feared a reduction in cargo premium revenue, contrary to
their own apocalyptic objection that the Hamburg Rules would constitute a "brand new regime of
international law governing ocean liability, requiring years. of litigation to clarify issues." Betz,
supra note 28, at 52-54.
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insurance costs will drop if the carrier is more liable for losses. In theory,
this should occur because the cargo insurer will recover a greater share of
its payments from the carrier through subrogation. The cargo insurer,
knowing that its net payments will be lower, could charge lower
premiums, while the liability insurer could charge higher premiums.
However, there are still two questions to be answered. First, how much
decrease and increase will there be? Second, how quickly will the reduced
and increased premiums take effect? Not only is it unclear whether the
Hamburg Rules significantly shift the risk of loss from cargo interests to
the carrier, but most shippers would still prefer to purchase cargo
insurance even if the carrier were fully liable for all cargo damage.
In light of the foregoing theoretical review and qualitative
exploration, it is unlikely that the Hamburg Rules will have the dramatic
effect on the double insurance problem by efficiently and economically
shifting the shipper's risk from the cargo insurer to the shipowner's
liability insurer in the near future. Instead, if the Hamburg Rules impose
such heavy liability on the carrier, this will increase what are perceived as
wasteful double insurance expenses from the standpoint of the total
economic system, but it will not affect freight directly for a substantial
time. Moreover, it will take considerable time for the Hamburg Rules to
realize its potential to affect the double insurance problem even though
they strengthen carrier liability in the end, and it is for this reason that
cargo owners have to trust shipping companies to render prompt and full
compensation. In short, the gap between the ideal of the Hamburg Rules
and actual business practices will continue for some time to come.
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